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the view expressed by the court appears to be a sound interpreta-
tion of the codal provisions. However, in one respect it appears
that the court seriously erred. In refusing to dismiss the case as
of nonsuit and declaring the sale not subject to rescission for
lesion beyond moiety, the court denied the absent coheirs any
right to assert the rescission at a future time. As they had been
made parties to the action and were before the court the decision
would be res judicataA Under the exceptional circumstances of
this case, in the absence of affirmative showing that the absent
coheirs did not desire to join in the action, it would have been
far preferable to dismiss the action of the plaintiffs as of nonsuit
in justice to the possible interests of the absentees."




The Louisiana Supreme Court was recently urged to impose
liability without regard to fault upon an oil driller whose well
blew during the course of the drilling operation." The result of
this calamity was the destruction of a large part of the plaintiff's
rice crop which was being cultivated on a six hundred acre tract
nearby. The plaintiff sought to fasten strict liability on the de-
fendant under the doctrine of "sic utere tuo, ut alienum non lae-
das'' 2 and under the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,3 which had
been applied in an identical situation by the Supreme Court of
California several years before;4 although that court, like the
court of Louisiana, had rejected the same doctrine with reference
to other so-called ultrahazardous activities.
The supreme court managed to avoid the choice of doctrine
by finding that the defendant was liable under ordinary prin-
8. Art. 2286, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. The circumstances suggest that the absentees by accepting service
may have intended to acquiesce in plaintiffs' demand.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Watkins v. Gulf Refining Co., 206 La. 942, 20 So. (2d) 273 (1944).
2. Art. 667, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affirmed L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1878). Bohlen, The
Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1911) 59 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 298.
4. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928). See
Carpenter, The Doctrine of Green v. General Petroleum Corporation (1932)
5 So. Calif. L. Rev. 263.
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ciples of negligence. Resort was had to the res ipsa loquitur rule.
And the court re-announced the familiar statement that, where
damages are caused by an instrumentality under the exclusive
control of a defendant and they would not ordinarily have oc-
curred if the party in control had used due care, the mere show-
ing of the happening of the accident places upon the defendant
the burden to exculpate itself from the imputation of fault.
The details of the conduct of the drilling operations were
spread over six pages of the printed report, and an evaluation
of the care exercised by the defendant requires an intimate
knowledge of drilling processes which most of us do not possess.
Nevertheless, the writer, after consultation with persons familiar
with oil production, ventures the opinion that the operations in
this case were conducted in accordance with accepted practices
prevailing in the locality. Although the court suggested four
particulars in which the defendant fell short of due care, 5 these
were largely the result of substituting hindsight for foresight.
By viewing an occurrence of this sort after the fact it is nearly
always possible to suggest some additional precaution which, if
adopted, might have prevented the occurrence. The court does
not mention the fact that some of the omitted precautions which
it suggested either threatened the successful prosecution of the
enterprise or the safety of the operators (as in the "snubbing in"
operation). Likewise the opinion largely ignores the fact that
the determination as to what method or methods should be
adopted to control the blow out must be made under emergency
conditions. The several available procedures are all uncertain
in effectiveness, and the choice is substantially affected by the
operator's appraisal of the situation prevailing when the catas-
trophe arises. The only circumstance that cast suspicion on the
defendant's conduct was the use of standard equipment in the
face of knowledge that drilling was to be done in a high pres-
sure area. Even here, however, it is doubtful that heavier
equipment would have avoided the catastrophe.
The above remarks are not made by way of criticism of the
case. They are intended merely to show that there are effective
ways of imposing strict responsibility through the use of the lan-
guage of negligence, and without resort to doctrines of absolute
liability. The network of negligence rules permits of innum-
erable variations; and in hitching the standard of care up to top-
notch, gadgets such as res ipsa loquitur are of immense service
5. Watkins v. Gulf Refining Co., 206 La. 942, 960, 20 So. (2d) 273, 279
(1944).
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to the court., Although the court still assures operators that they
can avoid the risk of liability for damage resulting from blow-
outs provided they use "due care," this is poor comfort to oil pro-
ducers who are familiar with the procedures followed by the de-
fendant in the instant case and who know what precautionary
measures are feasible in their own operations. Yet it is believed
that the court reached a desirable conclusion. Oil drilling is haz-
ardous even when all precautions have been taken. The profits
are large, and those who are exposed to the dangers are rightly
indifferent to the success of the defendant's venture. He, not his
victims, should be forced to bear the loss. The use of the negli-
gence-via-res ipsa loquitur route toward absolute liability sim-
ply gives the court a better control of the dispute and permits
a possible retreat in extreme instances. This is good judging
technique.
There is a well established rule everywhere that the car-
rier of passengers, unlike the freight carrier, is not an insurer
of safety. Nevertheless, his situation differs from that of
the ordinary defendant who is charged with negligence. The
carrier of passengers must affirmatively exonerate himself from
the presumption of negligence that arises when the passenger
shows that he was injured through the agency of the carrier. It
is usually said that the carrier of passengers must show that he
has exercised the "highest degree of care." Thus the courts are
required to distinguish different degrees of fault in these cases.
In a recent decision a passenger sought to impose liability upon
the defendant carrier by a showing of fact which admittedly
would not have made the carrier liable if he had been a private
defendant. 7 The driver of the defendant's bus was proceeding on
the right side of the highway as he approached an oncoming
mowing machine which was followed by two trucks. The first
of these trucks suddenly retarded its speed upon approaching the
mowing machine ahead so as to avoid the danger of passing in
the face of the oncoming bus. The driver of the second truck
6. The use of res ipsa loquitur in cases involving injuries by dangerous
substances and instruments is described in Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and
Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases (1941) 4 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 70, 95.
7. Gross v. Teche Lines, Inc., 207 La. 354, 21 So. (2d) 378 (1945). Compare
the interesting case, Wichita Transp. Corp. v. Braly, 150 F. (2d) 315 (C.C.A.
10th, 1945), noted in (1946) 34 Geo. L. J. 114, where a passenger was thrown
to the floor of the defendant's bus when it was brought to a sudden stop in
an emergency. The court held that the defendant could not exonerate itself
from blame merely by showing that all care had been used in bringing the
bus to a halt; it must likewise show that the emergency was not of its own
making.
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was inexcusably unaware of the situation in front of him. When
the first truck suddenly checked its speed, he was unable to slow
down sufficiently to remain in the traffic line, and he attempted
to pass. This brought him into headlong collision with the bus,
which by this time had reached the mowing machine. During
this period the busdriver was unaware that any vehicle behind
the mower intended to pass it. When the situation became ap-
parent to him, he drew the bus sharply over to the right and
onto the shoulder. It was here that the collision took place. The
court held that the busdriver violated no duty to his passengers
by not maintaining his bus under such control that it could im-
mediately stop when it became apparent that a blockage of the
highway had occurred. In the absence of some suspicious circum-
stance the driver of a vehicle is entitled to assume that one of
several oncoming vehicles will not disregard an obvious peril
and attempt to overtake the others at such a time. The imposi-
tion of a more rigid requirement upon the carrier of passengers
under the guise of enforcing the duty of "highest care" would
unreasonably interfere with speedy and efficient passenger serv-
ice.
Interests Protected-Emotional Disturbance
Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, Incorporated,8 is the only deci-
sion of any importance during the last term on the subject of
emotional disturbance. This case has been treated in detail else-
where in the Louisiana Law Review," and only a brief reference
is appropriate here. The plaintiff, a cripple, was refused admis-
sion to the defendant's motion picture theater, on the asserted
ground that his presence during crowded hours involved a safety
hazard. This action was apparently in compliance with a fixed
rule of the defendant's establishment. The refusal was appar-
ently made in the presence only of the attendant and the plaint-
iff's wife. For this reason no claim for damages for defamation
was asserted. The plaintiff based his case upon the discourteous
treatment that was accorded him, although evidence of any
unnecessary rudeness was meager. In allowing recovery, the
supreme court emphasized the breach of contract by the de-
fendant and treated the damages for emotional disturbance as
incidental thereto. In previous decisions the Louisiana Supreme
Court has taken a more liberal and straightforward approach to
8. 207 La. 835, 22 So. (2d) 189 (1945).
9. Note (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW RviEw 475.
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the problem of recovery for intentionally inflicted emotional dis-
turbance. For example, in Nickerson v. Hodges0 the victim of a
practical joke was allowed to recover for the ensuing mental an-
guish without reference to any other breach of duty. This deci-
sion was grounded squarely on Article 2315 of the Louisiana
Civil Code. In the present case the court preferred to adopt a
more timid attitude which it had manifested in the earlier cases
of Lewis v. Holmes" and O'Meallie v. Moreau,12 although those
decisions did not offer very striking analogies to the situation be-
fore the court.'3 Perhaps the court's reluctance to adopt the more
direct approach of the Nickerson case arose from the fact that it
did not consider that the facts of the present controversy pre-
sented a situation wherein the defendant's conduct was suffi-
ciently insolent to be dealt with as an independent tort. Per-
haps, too, it was felt that discourtesy is not as clearly a violation
of prevailing notions of right and wrong as was manifested by
the heartless practical jokers of the Nickerson case who buried
a phony pot of gold with the intention of enjoying the embar-
rassment of their victim. The accompanying contract breach
was therefore resorted to in order to lend added weight to the
instant decision.
Nuisance and Injunctive Relief
In the case of Magee v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad
Company,14 the defendant maintained a roundhouse in a residen-
tial section of Bossier City with the result that the nearby homes
of the eight plaintiffs were covered with smoke, soot and cinders.
The court awarded substantial damages, including an item for
mental anguish. The defendant contended that damages for
mental anguish are allowed only in suits for personal injuries
and not in suits for property damages. Ordinarily, compensation
of this nature is denied, except so far as it might be an accom-
paniment of the plaintiff's own physical injury or sickening.
However, in nuisance cases the annoyance, inconvenience and
physical discomfort which usually accompany the nuisance are
difficult to distinguish from mental anguish. Since all the first
10. 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
11. 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903).
12. 116 La. 1020, 41 So. 243 (1906).
13. In each of these earlier cases the plaintiff's emitional disturbance
consisted of embarrassment or disappointment arising out of its failure to
receive the promised performance, while in the instant decision the wrong,
if any, was the discourteous conduct that accompanied the breach.
14. 206 La. 121, 19 So. (2d) 21 (1944).
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mentioned items are compensable, the court was correct in re-
fusing to draw the distinction urged upon it by defendant's coun-
sel. It stated that worry, discomfort and inconvenience, which
had been currently recognized as compensable items in previous
cases, were indistinguishable from mental anguish as that term
was used in the present case.
Since the nuisance complained of was a result of continuing
activity, it was clear that periodic damage suits would not afford
an adequate remedy. Full relief could be provided only by an
injunction ordering the defendant to refrain from future intru-
sions upon the adjoining landowners' rights. The right to such
injunctive relief, in addition to an award of damages to date of
trial, is well established by the cases. Defense counsel urged, in
the instant case, that substantial efforts had been made to elimi-
nate the smoke, soot and cinders through the installation of so-
called smoke suppressors and fly ash suppressors. While this
equipment perhaps helped the situation, it was not sufficient to
afford necessary relief and the trial judge had ordered the de-
fendant railway company to abate the nuisance. Following a
traditional injunction technique, the court merely ordered abate-
ment of the condition, leaving the methods to be worked out by
the defendant.
In overruling an objection that the decree offered no sugges-
tion as to what additional steps should be taken, the supreme
court approved the trial judge's statement that it was for de-
fendant and not the court to ascertain and apply the remedy.
After pointing out that the nuisance still remained, despite the
railroad's efforts, the trial judge concluded:
"'I am not convinced that everything has been done which
can be done to remedy the condition of which complaint is
made. Not being a practical railroad man, no suggestion is
offered, but defendant ought to think of a way to abate the
nuisance.' ,,15
This practical technique of placing the burden of devising the
means of abating the nuisance squarely on the wrongdoer's
shoulders, without serious effort to draw definite lines for his
guidance, is a practical one, and has been generally adopted.
That the railroad had not exhausted the possible means of abate-
ment is indicated by the supreme court's suggestion that the
erection of a roundhouse with a smoke eliminator on a tall cen-
15. 206 La. 121, 137. 19 So. (2d) 21, 26.
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Courts are continuously faced with the necessity of distin-
guishing an employee, who is entitled to compensation, from an
independent contractor, who does not receive the benefit of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Sometimes a person who enters
upon an enterprise as an independent contractor may abandon
his work and undertake a specific task under the direction of his
employer. If he is injured at such a time, he is entitled to com-
pensation, even though the deviation from his independent un-
dertaking is temporary only.17 Thus, in Langley v. Finlay"
the deceased had undertaken the task of cleaning defendant's oil
well which had ceased to produce. Before his work was com-
pleted the defendant decided to make a test for production,
which involved several operations. The deceased abandoned his
cleaning work with the understanding that he should resume if
the test were unsuccessful. He assisted the defendant's agent in
the testing procedure, and at times participated in the job with-
out any detailed supervision, and he supplied his own equipment.
During these operations the derrick collapsed and fell upon him,
killing him instantly. His widow was allowed compensation, de-
spite the defendant's contention that deceased was either an
independent contractor or a volunteer. Certainly the deceased
had no interest in the result of the testing, except insofar as the
failure of the tests might involve a resumption of his cleaning
operations, which by that time had been virtually completed.
Also, it seems clear that he gave his assistance in the testing op-
erations with the tacit understanding that he would be paid
therefor, and he participated at the request of the defendant's
agent. For this reason the conclusion of the supreme court that
he was not a volunteer seems clearly correct.
During the course of the opinion the court took occasion to
hold expressly that casual employments are covered by the
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act. Although recovery for
injuries arising out of casual employments had been allowed
16. The above discussion of injunctive relief against nuisance was pre-
pared with the collaboration of Dale E. Bennett, Associate Professor of
Law, Louisiana State University.
17. 4 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (3 ed. 1941) §1076.
18. 207 La. 307, 21 So. (2d) 229 (1944).
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previously on many occasions, the matter has not been expressly
passed upon before by the supreme court.19 In view of the fact
that compensation is permitted under the Louisiana Workmen's
Compensation Act only where it is shown that the injury arose
out of an employment in the course of the employer's hazardous
business, the exclusion of casual employments would be an un-
desirable further restriction which would not be warranted by
the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In the case of Laine v. Junca20 plaintiff was a field hand who
voluntarily assisted in running some mules into a pen. The per-
son who regularly performed this duty was on the scene at the
time, and it does not appear that the plaintiff was requested to
give assistance. There is no evidence, however, that his help
was objected to in any way. He was denied compensation for the
loss of an eye occasioned by his being struck in the face with the
whip he was holding. The decision that he was a mere volun-
teer is not very convincing. Farming operations are not generally
divided into such specialties. It is difficult to believe that if the
plaintiff had struck a bystander in the face with the whip, recov-
ery would have been denied on the ground that the employee
was not acting in the course of his employer's business. The
explanation of the case probably lies in the fact that the defend-
ant was engaged in a purely agricultural pursuit, although this
fact had not been expressly set up by him.
Prematurity of Suit; Prescription
Prior to 1926 an employee was entitled to a judgment fixing
the amount of compensation, the terms of payment, and other
matters in dispute between him and his employer, notwithstand-
ing the fact that when this suit was brought he was being paid
compensation at the maximum allowable rate.2 In that year,
however, the present amended Section 18(1) (B) was included
in the Workmen's Compensation Act.2 This section provides in
substance that an action for compensation will be regarded as
premature and will be dismissed unless the complaint alleges
19. The court of appeal held that casual employees are protected by the
Workmen's Compensation Act in Ranson-Rooney v. Overseas Ry., 134 So.
765 (La. App. 1931). This Judgment was reversed by the supreme court on
grounds that left the matter of casual employment undecided. Rooney v.
Overseas Ry., Inc., 173 La. 183, 136 So. 486 (1931).
20. 207 La. 280, 21 So. (2d) 150 (1945).
21. Ford v. Fortuna Oil Co., 151 La. 489, 91 So. 849 (1922); Daniels v.
Shreveport Producing & Refining Corp., 151 La. 800, 92 So. 341 (1922); Hulo
v. City of New Iberia, 153 La. 284, 95 So. 719 (1923).
22. La. Act 85 of 1926, § 18(1)(B) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4408(1)(B)].
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"that the employee or the dependent is not being or has not been
paid .. .the maximum per centum of wages to which petitioner
is entitled" under the act.
Thereafter, the courts of appeal took the position that an
employee cannot institute an action for compensation where he
has been paid or is still being paid compensation at the maximum
rate fixed by the act. Under these circumstances his petition
will be dismissed as premature even though the employer or his
insurer may deny the employee's claims either as to the length
that time payments shall continue, or even with respect to the
amount of future payments. 2 In such instances the act ade-
quately protects the employee's interest with reference to pre-
scription.
24
Difficulty has arisen where, following the accident, the em-
ployer, in lieu of paying compensation, maintains the employee
on the payroll in one capacity or another, either at his former
salary or at least with a wage that equals the maximum allow-
able compensation rate. Several questions arise in this situation.
First, is the employee subject to the one year prescriptive period?
If so, he is forced into an embarrassing election during his first
year of disability. He must choose to sue or not to sue. If he
sues, he will lose, in all probability, an advantageous wage
which exceeds the maximum allowable compensation. If he re-
frains from suit, he does so at the risk that his benefactor-em-
ployer may discharge him after one year and interpose a success-
ful plea of prescription to his claim for compensation. The pro-
visions of Section 31 of the act are none too clear with reference
to this situation. The language of this section deals expressly
only with the effect of compensation payments in preventing the
running of the prescriptive period.25 In 1940 in the case of Car-
penter v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company26 the Court of
Appeal for the First Circuit held that payment in the form of
wages for lighter service, which exceeded in amount the maxi-
mum allowable compensation, operated like compensation pay-
ments on the running of prescription, and that the employee
could safely institute his action within one year after the pay-
23. Moss v. Levin, 10 La. App. 149, 119 So. 558 (1929), on rehearing 120 So.
258 (La. App. 1929); Reiner v. Maryland Casualty Co., 185 So. 93 (La. App.
1938).
24. "... Where, however, such payments have been made in any case,
said limitations shall not take effect until the expiration of one year from
the time of making the last payment. . . ." La. Act 20 of 1914, § 31, as last
amended by La. Act 29 of 1934, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4420].
25. Ibid.
26. 194 So. 99 (La. App. 1940).
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ment of wages ceased or the wage fell below the allowable com-
pensation rate.
Recently the supreme court has deprived the Carpenter
case of much of the significance it was assumed to possess. 7
Arnold, who was employed by the Solvay Process Company, lost
an eye in the course of his employment. For six years thereafter
he was maintained on the payroll at the same or an increased
wage and he rendered full and unimpaired service to his em-
ployer. When the employer finally ceased wage payments, Ar-
nold instituted suit for compensation for the specific injury of
loss of an eye. The supreme court upheld the district and circuit
courts by announcing that the one year prescriptive period ap-
plied and Arnold's action was barred. At the same time it dis-
tinguished the Carpenter case by finding that in the latter case
the wage greatly exceeded the earning capacity of plaintiff, who
was furnishing reduced services. The rule as announced in
Arnold's case would place the employee in the position of having
to determine at his peril during the first year whether the wage
which he continues to receive is earned or is a sugar-coated com-
pensation payment. Only if the latter conjecture proved to be
correct could he assume that it is safe to wait beyond the one
year period.
Further light, however, was thrown on the matter in the re-
cent case of Thornton v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Com-
panyY8 An employee who had enjoyed his employer's generosity
by being retained on the payroll at full wages for reduced service
for eleven months instituted suit shortly before the expiration
of the one year period following the accident. Upon being served
with process the employer immediately discharged him and
placed him on a compensation basis. The employer likewise filed
a plea of prematurity, based on Section 18 (1) (B), already noted.
The supreme court, speaking through the chief justice, found that
Thornton had done well to institute his action before the expira-
tion of one year following the accident; for otherwise he would
have fallen before a plea of prescription. Said the court, wage
payments, unlike payments of compensation, do not preclude the
employee from instituting action at any time within the pre-
scriptive period. Section 18(1) (B) does not apply to such pay-
ments, even though the language of this section refers to "the
maximum per centum of wages to which the petitioner is en-
titled under the provisions" of the act. Since the employee is
27. Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8, 20 So. (2d) 407 (1944).
28. 207 La. 239, 21 So. (2d) 46 (1944).
[Vol. VI
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free to institute his action at any time under these circumstances,
there is no reason why his cause should not be barred one year
after the accident. There was a vigorous dissent by Justice Rog-
ers, in which Justice Odom concurred.
Under the majority opinion there appears to be little or
nothing left of the Carpenter case. In Arnold's case the court
had attempted to distinguish it on the ground that the payments
to Carpenter were compensation in disguise. But the Thornton
case seems indistinguishable on its facts. It is true that in the
latter case the court is directly concerned with prematurity of
action under Section 18(1) (B), but both the majority opinion
and the minority opinion seem to agree that so long as the
plaintiff cannot sue, because of prematurity, the employer can-
not include that period of disability in determining the time of
prescription. They likewise seem, to agree that so long as the
employee is free to sue there is no reason why prescription should
not run. Thus the two problems are inseparable, and the state-
ments in the opinion with reference to the running of prescrip-
tion cannot be disregarded as being mere dicta.
The situation, as it now stands, may be summarized as fol-
lows: Under the majority opinion the employee who is paid on
a wage basis following his accident is free at any time to sue for
compensation and thus relieve himself of the uncertainty of his
employer's welcome but perhaps capricious generosity. At the
same time he cannot enjoy that generosity for more than a year
without risking the success of his compensation claim.
Under the minority opinion, the employer could bestow
wage benefits in installments equal to or greater than the maxi-
mum allowable compensation rate for as long as he may choose,
and at the same time he may deny all the petitioner's rights. In
so doing, however, he would gain nothing by way of prescrip-
tion. This applies only to wages which are unearned and are
bestowed as gratuities. In cases of earned wages we must as-
sume the minority opinion has accepted the rule of the Arnold
case and would permit immediate suit.
Miscellaneous
The Workmen's Compensation Act establishes the basis of
compensation in terms of the wages that the plaintiff was receiv-
at the time of the accident. Where an employee who was injured
in 1937 returned to work on two occasions thereafter during the
year 1939 at a higher hourly wage, and during the course of his
re-employment suffered an aggravation of his injury, he is not
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
entitled to compensation based on the higher pay rate.29 Per-
haps a more difficult problem would have faced the court if the
plaintiff had been able to characterize the aggravations as sepa-
rate "accidents."' °




Revival of debt discharged in bankruptcy; What constitutes
promissory language sufficient to support subsequent legal action
on a debt discharged in bankruptcy? In Irwin v. Hunnewell,1
applying the well settled doctrine that a promise to pay a debt
discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding must be direct, definite,
unequivocal and more than a mere acknowledgment or expres-
sion of an intention, hope, desire or expectation to pay, the court
held that the plaintiff's action could not be maintained against
the bankrupt. 2 A message had been sent to the plaintiff that the
bill for his services "was to be taken care of" and that the ac-
count "would be paid." This was held not to be a definite prom-
ise to pay the debt. An expression in a subsequent letter that,
after payment of certain debts to the bankrupt's employer, the
plaintiff would "come first," was likewise held to be ineffective
as a promise. Similarly the bankrupt's expression-"my inten-
tions were good and the delay unavoidable"-coupled with an
offer to assign the proceeds of a life insurance policy payable at
death of the bankrupt to the plaintiff was held not to revive the
discharged debt.
The reason underlying the rule requiring an express and un-
equivocal promise to revive a debt discharged in bankruptcy is
that the discharge in bankruptcy extinguishes the pre-existing
debt and does not merely bar the remedy.4 In Louisiana, de-
spite vacillation in the jurisprudence on the question of whether
29. Holliday v. Martin Veneer Co., 206 La. 897, 20 So. (2d) 173 (1944).
30. Compare the interesting rationalization along this line in Harris v.
Southern Carbon Co., Inc., 162 So. 430 (La. App. 1935).
* Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 207 La. 422, 21 So. (2d) 485 (1945).
2. 7 Remington, A Treatise on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States
(1939) § 3505.
3. See Linton v. Stanton, 4 La. Ann. 401 (1849).
4. See 7 Remington op. cit. supra note 2, at § 8501.
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